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SCA response on critical remarks from ICRC and MSF
B. Kristiansson & L. Hjelm-Wallén, December 20, 2004
By Bengt Kristiansson, Secretary General and Lena Hjelm Wallén,
President of SCA (Swedish Committee for Afghanistan).
SCA signed a letter ahead of a summit NATO conference in Istanbul last June, and appealed to NATO to provide more troops for assisting Afghanistan in its efforts to establish security to its citizens and aid workers.
Security has been dramatically deteriorating over the last two years for Afghans and foreigners alike and the progress in establishing an environment in which humanitarian actions can be performed has been severely impeded. The most conspicuous expression of the situation emerged when MSF withdrew from Afghanistan following the killing of five MSF workers in Badghis. It tells something about how one party to the ongoing conflict in Afghanistan views one humanitarian actor, if not all.
In his article “The future of humanitarianism” Austen Davis, Director of MSF Holland, argues that the MSF normative framework is under attack, allegedly associated to the wider issue of identity of NGOs. Davis touches on a central issue for all of us who work within the humanitarian sector: who are we, and what are we trying to do? “With increasing numbers of agencies claiming to be humanitarian while trying to build peace, democracy and capacity, and develop state systems, these agencies claim humanitarian motives and identity”, says Davis. Presumably in contrast to many other NGOs, Davis states “we are motivated by defense of social goals and demand respect for the right to offer assistance to people in crisis”. “Humanitarian action …. …. is …carried out within a specific legal and political framework that defines conditions….” says further Davis.
I think that Davis distinctly illustrates the inherent problem in his own position.
1. The specific legal and political framework that he demands is not at hand in Afghanistan
2. MSF itself (like ICRC) also belongs to those agencies that “try(ing) to build peace, democracy and capacity”, if not all three, at least the latter.
Kenny Gluck at MSF Holland claims that NATO is a belligerent in Afghanistan and finds the NGOs’ call for security assistance by NATO accordingly inappropriate. SCA does not share this view at all. The presence of ISAF forces in Afghanistan is, unlike the coalition forces, not for warfare but for security stabilization, recognizing that security is the single most determining factor for delivering humanitarian or developmental assistance to Afghans. NATO is in Afghanistan to lead the ISAF troops on their UN-mandate. The Bonn agreement recognized that disarmament was a prerequisite for promoting peace and stability, together with establishment of some political institutions, to allow Afghans to rebuild the country after decades of war. The ISAF forces were there to add security during a transitional period of time.
One difficulty with this debate is the terminology and definitions of the terms “humanitarian, developmental, social and political” and which criteria decide the belonging to one or other type (class) of NGOs. Now these terms are applied somewhat arbitrarily. How and who will define where the boundary between humanitarian and developmental agencies go? And when does a humanitarian issue become a political? Is the need of security exclusively a political or military issue? And is the exit of an agency following insufficient security protection political or humanitarian? The definitions are subjective, not well thought of and incoherently applied. Therefore, the debate also tends to become unduly polarized.
SCA operates in large parts of the country with four major programs: health, education, disability and agriculture. In health, education and disability related work, SCA delivers service and builds capacity. So do MSF and ICRC in their respective fields, by training Afghans in vocational training and professional performance. What is it when a humanitarian organization offers courses in physiotherapy or HIV/Aids, train orthopedic technologists and vaccinators, if not capacity building? Do they then not belong to the “numbers of agencies claiming to be humanitarian while trying to build peace, democracy and capacity“? And what is it when services for women are set up despite a resisting male population (or at least subpopulation) if not an attempt at social transformation? The idea of “pure” humanitarian actions is not so convincing. Neutrality, impartiality etc are excellent aims and guides in the work, but still leave us in a dilemma and uncertainty on how these concepts are translated into the narrow boundaries of humanitarian actions, as Davis defines them – capacity building and women’s and girls rights being the most evident. Let us not be hypocritical about the fact that most of us seem to be involved in both capacity building and social transformation, in addition to our ”pure humanitarian mandate”.
On the issue of the UN mandated ISAF forces SCA believes and hopes that more ISAF troops will allow disarmament by the wardlords, decrease violation of human rights by them and others, increase the chances of the government to counter the narcotics trade and contribute to improved security for Afghans and aid workers who now sometimes are restricted from pursuing their humanitarian missions fully. SCA does not take side in any conflict by signing the letter to NATO. SCA simply addresses that the body assigned to provide security to Afghanistan – the UN-mandated ISAF forces - has not delivered sufficient security and needs accordingly to try to do so. It is not to advise on military questions, as Claire Magone writes. Does Magone really mean to say that NGOs lack the legitimacy to identify security to be a crucial problem for humanitarian assistance, and turn to the assigned actor whose responsibility is endorsed by the UN and the international community? Is that lobbying in military or political issues? In that case, how do the so critical NGOs cope with risk assessments and its consequences? The fact that NATO currently has the lead of the ISAF troops does not really change the mandate or the responsibility of security assistance to Afghanistan.
The lead role of NATO possibly contributes to blurring (or at least confusing) the lines between security assistance and troops for combat (US lead coalition), as does also the existence of PRTs (provincial reconstruction teams). The PRTs with the mix of reconstruction and security tasks, under the coalition at some places and under ISAF at others, has blurred the lines, mainly between military and civil functions. On this issue, we completely share the concerns of Davis, Gluck, Magone and Bosisio, although all four of them seem to be confused over the specific roles of the coalition forces (combat troops), ISAF troops (Security assistance) and NATO (lead responsibility of ISAF).
Finally, we welcome the debate and think it is desirable and necessary. In one way, there is the impression that reality indicates that the distinction between e. g. humanitarian, “limited humanitarian”, developmental, political or “multi-mandated” NGOs is already overdue, at least in the view of one part to the current conflict in Afghanistan; all of us, regardless of identity have been declared suitable targets of lethal attacks. Can that be reversed by a debate on roles and identities between us? Do we really believe that is caused by our diversification in humanitarian and developmental activities or anything blurred between such differences? Or does it need a profound rethinking of our concepts, approaches and strategies and finally a new analysis of the emerging environment?